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Duties to a Future Self 




In this paper, I will evaluate the notion of having duties to one’s future self. In doing so, I 
will discuss both ethical theories and metaethical theories. More specifically, I intend to utilize a 
prima facie duty-based ethical account and a psychological reductionist view of personal identity 
to argue that one can have duties to future selves. Relationships with our friends ground a number 
of objective agent-relative duties to them. I will argue that our relationships to our future selves 




In order to evaluate the notion of having duties to a future self, it is important to first get a 
handle on what it means to have a duty. In the following section, I will detail different ethical 
theories and examine the role of the concept of a duty to each.  
Consequentialism (Mill) 
The concept of a duty runs counter to the consequentialist approach to ethics. A 
consequentialist theory will posit an account of what is intrinsically valuable, as well as what 
constitutes the right way of producing the greatest net sum of intrinsic value. Although 




the consequences of actions, there are different versions of consequentialism. There are different 
ways to formulate a consequentialist theory in that both what is held to be intrinsically valuable 
and the principle of right action can change from one version to another. For example, a hedonist 
holds that only pleasure is intrinsically valuable, so the act that maximizes pleasure in relation to 
any pain is the right action to take. Additionally, while one hedonist might endorse actual 
consequentialism, another could endorse the idea that the right action is that which the actor 
believes will produce the greatest net sum of intrinsic value.1 Another still could endorse the 
expected utility view, which goes even further in that probabilities of different outcomes are used 
to choose the action which can be expected to maximize utility. There are more formulations, and 
different versions can end up with different moral judgments of actions.  
To further evaluate consequentialism, consider a rugby match. Sports, like rugby, can bring 
people pleasure. They can also bring pain. In a match, scoring brings pleasure to a team’s own 
players and their fans. Thus, by the hedonist view, scoring is instrumentally valuable—valuable as 
a means to achieving intrinsic value. To be the right action, such scoring must produce the greatest 
net pleasure. One side’s pleasure from scoring must be considered in relation to the pain felt by 
the other side. Even if one team’s scoring produces a negative net sum of value, like if the pain 
felt by the opposing side outweighs the pleasure felt by their own, it is still the right action if it 
produces a greater sum than any other actor could take. However, if the greatest net sum of pleasure 
could be produced by an actor doing that which would make the other side’s pleasure outweigh 
their own, such as knocking the ball forward so that it changes possession, consequentialism would 
require the player to take that action. 
 
1 Actual consequentialism holds that an action’s rightness, or wrongness, must be evaluated by the real 




 That is to say, a consequentialist theory is one of agent neutrality. It does not matter into 
whose life the value is brought; whether an actor’s action brings value to themselves or to a 
stranger, the right action is still the one maximizing the net sum.2 As will be evident elsewhere, 
many points in this paper could have, and do have, entire papers and books written about them. 
For example, some argue for forms of consequentialism that do not require agent neutrality. 
Examining such arguments is beyond the scope of this paper. Utilitarianism, as I will use the term, 
is a form of consequentialism which maintains that intrinsic value is only attached to the welfare 
of conscious beings, regardless of an actor’s relationship to them.3 As a consequentialist view, that 
means it is not only not an egoistic theory, it also does not consider motive in evaluating the 
rightness or wrongness of an action.4 
Consider a case of organ transplantation.5 Say there is a hospital in which five people are 
dying. Each has a different organ in failure than the others, meaning they each need a different 
kind of transplant to save them. Lying in another bed is a perfectly healthy person who is just there 
for a physical. This individual is of the proper blood type and their organs are all of adequate health 
to allow transplantation to each of the other five patients. Successful transplants would save the 
five patients but kill the donor.6 Given the utilitarian’s commitment to maximization, they are 
 
2 Only non-relative consequentialism will be discussed in this paper. 
3 This is a pluralist view, which can recognize knowledge, friendship, and other aspects of life as intrinsically 
valuable 
4 For a more thorough detailing of utilitarianism, see Mill, John Stewart. Utilitarianism. 1863. Trans. Jonathan 
Bennet (Early Modern Texts, 2005), specifically Chapter 2: what utilitarianism is. 
5 Philippa Foot posits a similar case in “The Problem of abortion and the doctrine of the double effect” Oxford 
Review 5 (1967) pp.5–15, while Gilbert Harman, The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1977) puts forth a nearly identical one. 
6 The word ‘donor’ might be read as suggesting a level of consent/willingness to provide the organs for transplant. 
Assuming any unwillingness would not have any negative impact on the consequences of saving the organ 





obligated to say, “cut up the one to save the five,” because the welfare of the five outweighs that 
of the one—if there were no other considerations.  
According to the utilitarian, the motives of the surgeon making the call to perform the 
operations do not matter for evaluating whether the action is right or wrong. However, motives 
can indicate whether the surgeon is a good or bad utilitarian actor and relatedly whether her actions 
are praiseworthy or blameworthy.7 A good actor is one intends to do the right thing—like the 
surgeon performing the transplants out of a motive to try to maximize the welfare of the people 
involved. This could be considered praiseworthy even if the surgeries failed and all six died 
because the intent to maximize intrinsic value was there. 
The consequences of the actions determine morality for the utilitarian approach. This is not 
consistent with how society has formed to operate, such as in actual cases of organ transplantation. 
People on transplant lists wait either for a donation from someone who can continue living without 
what they have donated or from the recently deceased. Such sentiment reveals the intuitive idea 
that there are reasons outside of the value produced that factor into whether or not an action should 
be performed. While the suffering and death of the other five patients is evidently bad, there is a 
duty not to kill the other innocent patient.  
Duties do not align with the consequentialist approach. If someone has made a promise to 
help a friend, but more net pleasure could be attained by a conscious being if that promiser stays 
on their couch eating chips instead, the promiser should do so according to some utilitarians. Even 
in the case of a principle of intrinsic value holding something like keeping promises as intrinsically 
valuable, the person whose promise is being kept does not matter. If choosing between an action 
that would fulfill one of their own promises and one that would mean two other people each 
 
7 This terminology can be ambiguous, as the actions of praising and blaming would entail their own consequences 




fulfilling a promise, the actor should choose the latter. This is out of line with the idea of agent-
relativity, a notion that will be discussed in more detail later. Seeing as the concept of duty is 
incompatible with consequentialism, the deontological approach proves favorable. 
Deontology 
 Like consequentialism, there are different deontological views, each of which has its 
strengths and weaknesses. First, seeing as the second formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative 
is what initially drew me to write a thesis, I wish to examine Kant’s moral theory.  
Kant 
As a deontologist, Immanuel Kant’s moral view focuses on agent motivation and adherence 
to duties. Rather than focus on the results or repercussions of an act to determine its worth, 
Kantians examine whether such conduct aligns with the actor’s duty. According to Kant, the 
conduct of an agent can only be morally right if they act in line with their duty.8 Possibly most 
identifiable with Kant’s view are his formulations of the categorical imperative.  
Unlike a hypothetical imperative, a categorical imperative determines what our duties are 
and applies to an individual irrespective of whether an action will attain outcomes they want.9 Kant 
provides three formulations of the categorical imperative, positing that each formulation is saying 
the same thing but in different ways. I will focus on the second one.10 The second formulation 
mandates that everyone “act in such a way as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in 
 
8 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. 1785. Trans. Jonathan Bennett (Early Modern Texts, 
2005) 
9 A hypothetical imperative takes the form of: if you want X, then you ought to do Y. The imperative here depends 
on the disposition of the actor. No matter the consequences or desires of the actor, the categorical instructs what 
one ought to do. 
10 The first formulation, sometimes called the Universal Law Formulation, mandates that one act as though the 
maxim of their action were to become, through their will, a universal law of nature. The third formulation of Kant’s 
Categorical Imperative states that everyone act as if through their maxim they were a legislating member in the 





that of anyone else, always as an end and never merely as a means.”11 Although talking about only 
one of these formulations might suggest the acceptance of all three formulations saying the same 
thing, considering the equivalence of three formulations is beyond the scope of this paper. It is for 
the sake of time that I will only examine the second formulation. 
Kant uses four cases to evaluate the categorical imperative, including the case of suicide. 
According to Kant, one cannot commit suicide because to do so would violate a perfect duty to 
oneself. People may consider suicide for a number of reasons, including immense physical pain or 
mental distress; an effort to end such suffering may be claimed as an act of self-love. Kant rejects 
this reasoning and instead holds that such an action could not be in accord with treating humanity 
as an end in itself because killing oneself to escape suffering would be using that self merely as 
means.12  
The second case is of lying, or false promises. A situation perhaps too many people are 
familiar with is when a relative or friend constantly asks to borrow money, promises to pay back 
the funds, but never does. When this person makes such a promise knowing they will not have the 
ability to actually return the funds, they are making a false promise. In doing so, they are violating 
a perfect duty to others, according to Kant. A false promise violates the second formulation 
because when making a false promise one uses the person they make the promise to merely as 
means; this is because the person being promised is not aware of the true ends. 
The third case, developing talents, seems especially applicable to one’s future self. 
According to Kant, a maxim like, ‘I’m going to sit and watch television for hours every night 
instead of practicing to develop my natural talent of solving complex equations,’ cannot be held. 
Ignoring one’s natural talents, according to Kant, hurts oneself and the rest of humanity because 
 





available potential goes unmet. Rather than treating humanity as a mere means, not developing 
one’s talents constitutes a maxim that does not harmonize with humanity.  
The fourth and final case Kant presents is of helping others. Kant again argues that willing 
an uncharitable system, like one in which nobody gives any money to those less fortunate, would 
disadvantage the individual were they themselves to fall on hard times. As in the case of 
developing talents, Kant argues for the duty of helping those in need by appealing to the second 
formulation’s criteria of harmonizing with humanity. This notion of harmonizing with humanity 
relates to the second formulation in that, although actions violating imperfect duties do not treat 
humanity as mere means, they fail to promote the ability to attain ends.   
The first two cases are examples of perfect duties, while the latter two are of imperfect 
duties. As alluded to, what conflicts with perfect duties for Kant involves a maxim that treats 
humanity as a mere means. Imperfect duties do not harmonize with humanity as an end. Perfect 
duties require the individual to always be in accordance with them and are situationally strict; 
imperfect duties also require adherence but there is more leeway in how they are fulfilled. 
The organ transplant case mentioned previously can be considered under Kant’s theory. 
Killing the individual to save the five would be using the one as a mere means, and therefore be a 
violation of a perfect duty. Thus, according to the Kantian perspective, such an act would be wrong. 
This result improves on the consequentialist’s, but Kant’s approach is not without flaws. 
An issue for any deontological theory would seem to be how to deal with conflicts between 
duties. According to Kant, one cannot permissibly act in conflict with one’s duty, regardless of 
what the consequences of doing so might be. Whether someone has come to your door with the 
intent of murdering someone who only you know the location of, or you would need to lie about 




promises as always wrong. According to him, there are not situational variables which could affect 
the morality of such actions. Like consequentialism, this sort of absolutist deontological theory 
proves problematic in its extremism, which suggests needing something in between the two. As 
such, a theory that allows for more situational evaluations while maintaining relativity is needed.  
Ross 
W.D. Ross posits such a view. As a deontologist, Ross’s theory evaluates the rightness of 
an action by how it aligns with the duties of the agent performing it. Unlike Kant’s deontological 
theory, Ross’s provides for conflicting duties by positing prima facie duties—non-maleficence, 
gratitude, fidelity, justice, self-improvement, reparation, and beneficence.13 They are not held on 
the same initial level, as a duty of non-maleficence would generally be stronger than that of 
beneficence, but they can conflict and situationally outweigh each other.  
For example, one may have a prima facie duty to help their friend move because they 
promised to do so. Imagine the person is on their way to help their friend move when they 
encounter a horrible car crash. They still have that prima facie duty to keep their promise, but now 
it seems they also have a prima facie duty to help the victims of the car accident.14 According to 
Ross, the person has a prima facie duty to keep their promise as well as a prima facie duty to help, 
and, because they cannot do both, they should do whichever they have a stronger moral reason to 
do. Their all things considered duty—what they ought to do considering the circumstances and the 
relevant prima facie duties—in this case would be helping the injured people. Having an all things 
considered duty does not mean the other prima facie duties are eliminated. Breaking the promise 
is still prima facie wrong and can entail uncomfortable feelings as well as a duty to make up for 
having broken it, but that does not mean the act was actually wrong.  
 
13 W. D. Ross, What Makes Right Acts Right (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930) 18 




Looking again to the transplant case, Ross’s theory could hold the same as Kant’s while 
the weight of the prima facie duties of non-maleficence outweighs those of the other prima facie 
duties, including beneficence. The surgeon’s all-things-considered duty would be to not remove 
the organs from the healthy patient as long as the amount of good produced by such an action 
would not outweigh the stricter duty of non-maleficence. However, the good produced as a 
consequence of actions, though not determinative in Ross’s theory, is still a factor for consideration 
where it is not in Kant’s. An adjustment to the case, such as that removing all of the healthy 
patient’s organs would save the lives of millions rather than saving only five, would entail Ross 
and Kant’s theories diverging in their answers. Kant’s absolutist views would still not allow for 
the healthy patient to be sacrificed, while the prima facie duty of beneficence would become the 
most heavily weighted in Ross’s view and thus entail an all-things-considered duty to sacrifice the 
patient.  
One can know of having a prima facie duty to keep a promise simply by reflecting on the 
notion of keeping a promise rather than needing to infer, and this extends to all prima facie duties. 
Keeping a promise is justified by its connection to a corresponding prima facie duty and prima 
facie duties are self-evident. He compares claims of them to those made about geometry. Just as 
we do not seek to justify the trust in the reasoning for the claim that a straight line can be drawn 
from any one point to another or that a circle can be constructed with any point as its center and 
any radius, Ross argues we should not have to justify our trust in this moral reasoning.15 
Kant’s case of the lying promise can provide further insight into the benefits of Ross’s 
view. Say Dolores is a single mother and has been unable to hold down a job. She and her three 
kids are starving, but she knows her landlord has money to spare. Dolores knows that she would 
 




not be able to pay back any borrowed money, but she needs to feed her kids and so asks for a loan 
promising to return the money. Again, according to Kant, this is never permissible. According to 
Ross, the prima facie duty to keep her promise still exists. However, so do other duties, like those 
to her children. Dolores’s relationship with her kids, and her responsibilities to them, matter. 
According to Ross, relationships like those between spouses, friends, child and parent, creditor 
and debtor, promisee and promiser, and fellow countrymen found prima facie duties.16 Thus, Ross 
writes of duties being agent-relative, referencing the “highly personal character of duty.”17 
Agent-Relative Duties 
 A duty can be agent-neutral or agent-relative. A duty is agent-neutral if it exists for anyone, 
regardless of anything specific about them; a duty is agent-relative if it does not have to exist for 
everyone and instead exists for a person because of their specific role or relation. Consider a 
situation in which a child is drowning in the ocean, not far from the shore. In terms of a general 
duty of beneficence, anyone on the beach who is capable of safely swimming out to rescue the 
child would be said to have an agent-neutral duty to do so. For identifying agent-relative duties, 
one must look at the specifics of the people there. One might think of the lifeguard on duty and the 
guardian of the child as each being in such a role in the situation to give them an agent-relative 
duty to help. After all, the lifeguard’s job is to help save any swimmer and the guardian is in a 
position of responsibility for the child’s welfare. 
 In addition to distinguishing agent-neutral from agent-relative, agent-relative can be further 
broken down into the subjective agent-relative and objective agent-relative.18 An agent-relative 
 
16 Ibid, p19 
17 Ibid, p22 
18 Diane Jeske makes this distinction between subjective and objective agent-relative reasons in “Friendship and 
Reasons of Intimacy,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63, no. 2, (2001) pp. 329-346 to argue for 




duty can be described as objective when the actor’s personal sentiment toward the action and 
persons involved are not relevant—they do not ground the duty. That which is subjective agent-
relative is not so coherently described as a duty. Instead, talking in terms of subjective agent-
relative reasons makes more sense. Having a subjective agent-relative reason is grounded by 
valuing the object. Calling back to the example of the child drowning, the guardian’s relationship 
as such to the child grounds an objective agent-relative duty to save them—regardless of how they 
feel about the child, they are responsible for its wellbeing. The guardian can also have subjective 
agent-relative reasons to help the child, such as if they care about the child and want them to do 
well. In Ross’s view, prima facie duties, such as that arising from making a promise, are grounds 
for objective agent-relative duties.  
 Some theories concerning agent-relative duties require more involved talk about the 
self/personal identity and so I will come back to them after briefly discussing some metaphysical 
aspects of the notion of self. From here on I will endorse Ross’s ethical theory regarding duties 
because it allows for the consideration of consequences, unlike Kant’s view, without them being 
the only consideration, unlike a consequentialist view. As such, it also allows for agent-relative—
both subjective and objective—considerations. 
 
II 
Metaphysics – Self 
Defining the self will be important in establishing how a person at one time is related to 
themselves at a different time. Many efforts have been made at giving an account of what 






 In Meditations, René Descartes sets out to reconsider everything he thinks he knows. He 
wants to establish absolutely secure foundational beliefs on which to build so as to not include any 
false ones. As these considerations progress, he famously posits, “cogito, ergo sum,” meaning “I 
think, therefore I am.”19 From this, it is derived that the essential property of a mental substance 
(soul or self) is the generic cognitive power of thought, and not any physical instantiation or 
characteristic. A substance dualist, Descartes holds that the mind is one kind of substance, and the 
body is another. The body, rather than being defined by the power of thought, is defined by 
extension. In discussing physical substance, Descartes famously uses the wax example in which 
he describes the properties of a piece of wax before and after being melted. Descartes talks about 
changing wax to suggest the only essential property is extension. The thinking mind can persist 
without such a body, but the two are also joined in some way, by God, so as to allow for sensory 
experiences, like the pain of stubbing one’s toe.  
 Important to the discussion of the self is getting a better idea of what this mental substance 
is. It is attributed only the power to think. Any particular psychological attributes of an individual 
are not counted as essential by this view. When remembering John Belushi, words like funny and 
manic come to mind in describing his personality. However, on Descartes’s approach, these are 
not essential features of the mental substance; it is the fundamental ability to think that matters. 
When John Belushi died, the mental substance would have persisted, according to Descartes, but 
would no longer have been attached to time or space via a body.  
 Making sense of how these two substances could interact and how individual substances 
could be individuated are two issues for the Cartesian view. If someone were to be reduced only 
 




to their ability to think, irretrievably losing all of their other characteristics and psychological traits, 
including their memories, it seems that most of us would want to say that they were no longer the 
same person as they were before this happened. Looking now to Locke, his view is one that 
supports such intuitions. 
Locke 
 John Locke does not believe people can be identified with the mental substance posited by 
Descartes; the mental substance cannot determine persistence through time. Instead, Locke’s view 
is a reductionist theory especially focused on memory. He discusses identity most directly in the 
chapter “Of Identity and Diversity”.20 Locke puts forth the case of the prince and the cobbler, and 
this example will be helpful for illuminating Locke’s own theory as well as for comparing Locke’s 
theory to Descartes’.  
 In the prince and cobbler example, the soul of a prince, accompanied by his 
consciousness—an ability, inseparable from thinking, that allows an individual to be aware of and 
consider their reasons and thoughts over time and space— overtakes the body of a cobbler whose 
own soul has gone. The underlying question here is, who is this person with the ‘soul’ of the prince 
but the body of the cobbler? The person has the same memories as the prince, and only the prince. 
Locke claims that this person is the prince. In doing so, he makes the argument that the individual 
would be the same person as the prince, but be the same man as the cobbler, outwardly. Thus, 
while the identity of a man requires reference to a body, the identity of a person does not and 
instead involve a continuation of consciousness. This idea of a consciousness that persists through 
time represents an important concept to Locke’s theory—the diachronic self. Descartes, in arguing 
for his dualist view, focuses on synchronous identity. 
 




 The prince and cobbler case presents several issues for Descartes’ view. First, it is hard to 
even imagine what a transfer of mental substance would entail. Connecting two completely 
different substances seems impossible and the appeal to divine intervention leaves a lot to be 
desired already, and the idea of severing and then reconnecting a soul to a different body just 
deepens these concerns. However, maybe a transfer of substance is not Descartes’ only possible 
reply. Rather, it does not seem inconsistent with Descartes’ view to answer that there was no switch 
of mental substance. This of course requires a slight rewrite of the situation, which has already 
described the soul of the prince shifting to the cobbler, whose soul has left. Instead, imagining a 
case in which one individual has lost all of their psychological characteristics and completely 
assumed the characteristics of another, Descartes might try to respond that the characteristics of 
the original mental substance of the cobbler have changed but that it is the same substance. This, 
too, is unsatisfactory. 
 Regarding the person as assuming the identity of the prince, Locke’s prince-cobbler 
example illustrates his rejection of the bodily criterion of personal identity. Rather, Locke endorses 
the psychological criterion of personal identity. According to Locke’s version of this view, it is 
the continuity of a person’s consciousness that matters for personal identity, not an irreducible 
mental substance. To discuss a person’s identity, by this view, the subject must have some sort of 
persistence through time. As this holds for Parfit as well, I will discuss the idea of a persisting self 





Opposed to the dualism of Descartes, Derek Parfit argues for a reductionist view of 
personal identity.21 He describes a reductionist view of personal identity as one that claims that the 
fact of a person’s identity over time just involves “the holding of certain more particular 
facts…these facts can be described in an impersonal way”.22 A version of this view may only 
consider psychological aspects, such as “thoughts, desires, intentions, and other mental states”.23 
Parfit endorses this version of reductionism—psychological reductionism—and argues that the 
continuity and connectedness of a person’s psychology is what ultimately matters in discussing 
the self. Parfit defines both psychological connectedness and psychological continuity. Person A 
is psychologically connected to Person B if A holds direct psychological connections to B, and 
psychologically continuous with Person B if A holds overlapping chains of direct relations.24 
Psychological connectedness and/or psychological continuity is referred to by Parfit as Relation 
R. 25 His version of the reductionist view is less narrow than Locke’s as it encompasses more than 
just memory in considering psychological continuity; Parfit holds a broader view in which other 
characteristics, like personality traits, intentions, and beliefs, can constitute psychological 
continuity.  
Importantly, seeing as the word ‘identity’ has already been mentioned several times, Parfit 
actually argues that our psychological continuity/connectedness is what is important rather than 
one’s identity. Though there are difficulties for Parfit’s view as well, considering them is beyond 
 
21 This discussion of Parfit will be based on two of his works, “Personal Identity,” The Philosophical Review 80 
(1971) pp. 3-27 and Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) and there is significant overlap. 
His essay was publsihed earlier, and its contents can be seen throughout the later book, especially in chapter 12, 
titled “Why Our Identity is not What Matters”. 
22 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 210 ; his emphasis. 
23 Ibid 
24 Ibid, 206 





the scope of this project. In explanation and defense of his view, Parfit offers thought experiments 
of fission and fusion.26 
In the division cases, Parfit describes brain transplants. He proposes that most would agree 
that if a person’s brain, I will call this the brain of Person A, were transplanted and correctly wired 
into a brainless body so that the new body had all of the psychological traits (including the 
memories) of Person A, the ‘new’ individual would be Person A. Parfit then proposes a case where 
each hemisphere of Person A’s brain is successfully transplanted into a separate body. Each new 
individual possesses the same psychological traits as Person A, and so of the other individual—at 
least initially. He suggests three possibilities for Person A: a) they do not survive, b) they survive 
as one or the other of the two, and c) they survive as both individuals.27 He argues that (a) seems 
too similar to the first transplant case to claim one as a success and the other as a failure, and for 
(b), distinguishing one of the surgeries from the other when they are the same psychologically is 
incoherent; the decision would be arbitrary. The last option, (c), precludes survival based on 
identity because the two resulting people cannot both share an identity as identity is transitive. 
Instead, Parfit argues that judging the case in terms of continuity and connectedness, without any 
corresponding talk of identity, allows for the answer that Person A does not survive as either person 
has the same connection to both as she would to her future self had she survived. Asking who 
Person A is is an empty question. Psychological continuity does not require a one-one relation.28 
In a case of fusion, the brains of two people are connected. Consider a situation in which 
the bodies of each individual in a couple are gravely injured in a car accident, but portions of their 
brains can be salvaged and then fused together. The resulting brain, a combination of one half of 
 
26 Derek Parfit, “Personal Identity,” 4-5 
27 Parfit, Reasons and Persons (1984), 256 ; Derek Parfit, “Personal Identity,” The Philosophical Review 80 (1971) 
pp. 3-27 




each person’s individual brain, is stuck into a new body. The result of this is imagined to be distinct 
from that of the fission case. In the fission case, the person’s characteristics are replicated and 
unchanged, while in the fusion case the two people’s characteristics are brought together to form 
something new. For example, my roommate and I both love cats, so brought together this 
characteristic would be compatible and persist if our brains were fused. However, my roommate 
also loves eating microwaveable breakfast sandwiches and I hate them, so, brought together, by 
Parfit’s view, these characteristics would cancel each other out and the resulting feeling toward 
those deplorable sandwiches from our fused brain would be something like neutrality.  
Given these changes in psychological characteristics, Parfit suggests that anyone endorsing 
the idea that such a transformation would really be death is less unreasonable than the person 
endorsing that view for the fission case. However, he still disagrees. He first replies that the altering 
of some of our characteristics hardly seems to constitute our death—in fact, many people actively 
want their characteristics to change. For example, people seek out hypnotism in an effort to change 
the unhealthy characteristic of loving smoking cigarettes. Additionally, Parfit suggests similarities 
between the fusion case and getting married, stating that there can be a choice in the partner for 
fusion and that each has about as much of what he calls “intentional control” over what the person 
with the fused brain does as the control each part of a married couple has over their joint actions.29 
Thus, Parfit takes the fusion case to show that psychological continuity allows for degrees, whereas 
survival defined by identity does not.  
The ideas of psychological continuity and connectedness are key to Parfit’s argument, and 
he endorses the idea of quasi-memories to make them plausible in cases of branching. He puts 
forth a definition of quasi memories, or q-memories: one is q-remembering an experience if (1) 
 




they have a belief about a past experience that is apparently a memory, (2) that experience did 
occur for someone, and (3) in the right kind of way, the memory is causally dependent on that real 
past experience.30 Parfit argues that such memory does not require identity, because even though 
our q-memories are typically of our own experiences, there is nothing that requires them to be. He 
takes these quasi scenarios to hold for other direct psychological connections as well, including 
intentions and character traits. 
This notion of psychological continuity is related to the concept of people being composed 
of temporal parts. Similar to Locke, it is important to Parfit’s view that objects can exist through 
time, as the reductionist view concerns personal identity over time. Four-dimensionalism holds 
that, like the dimensions of space, time is a dimension. According to this view, things have 
temporal parts the same way that they have spatial ones: a spatial part of my car is its tire while a 
temporal part could be it being in my garage yesterday. This applies to humans as well, meaning 
persons exist through time as temporal parts—sometimes called person stages.31 Although diving 
too deep into metaphysical concepts of time would be tangential to my argument in this paper, it 
is important to mention that some conceptions of time would seem to be inconsistent with the 
notion of person stages.  
Presentism holds that only the present moment exists, and that what is the present moment 
changes.32 The idea of there being any temporal parts at different times, such as a future self, is 
incompatible with such a view. Eternalism, holding that past, present, and future all exist and that 
 
30 Ibid, 15 ; references Shoemaker’s “quasi-memory” and Penelhum’s “retrocognition”; there are those who will 
argue that quasi-memories are not possible and so cannot assure that psychological continuity does not 
presuppose personal identity, but evaluating such arguments is beyond the scope of this paper. 
31 Thomas Sider writes in detail about four-dimensionalism, Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and 
Time (Clarendon Press, 2013) 





whatever moment is ‘present’ does not change, is more compatible with four-dimensionalism.33 
The concept of person stages is important in my forthcoming discussion of duties to future selves. 
Without such temporal parts, the notion of having a duty to a future self would be incoherent—the 
self now would be indistinguishable from any other self later or prior, like in Descartes’ account. 
Parfit does not argue for the same conclusion that I do. Instead, Parfit takes his 
psychological reductionism to a utilitarian end of universalizability. I wish to discuss this more in 
a later section of this paper, but for now, I want to go forward with a psychological reductionist 
view of personal identity. Unlike Parfit, I will argue that there can still be a prioritization of duties 
to certain others, including to future selves.34 
 
III 
Duties to Future Selves 
With a Rossian view of duty and a psychological reductionist account of the self, I want to 
argue that a person can have duties to a future self. There exist not just subjective agent-relative 
reasons to act for a future self, but also objective agent-relative prima facie duties to do so. These, 
similar to circumstances in other relationships, are grounded in one’s relation to their future self. 
Other Relationships 
In order to get an idea of a person’s relationship to their future self, I want to discuss other 
relationships and later compare them with the relationship to a future self. Other situations where 
it seems that we, at least intuitively, have obligations grounded in the special relationships we have 
to other people include when these people are family and friends. To start, there is the relationship 
 
33 Ibid ; Diving more thoroughly into issues of time/ontology has been undertaken in other works, including 





between a parent and their child. Unlike other animals, like snakes, who have no parental instincts 
and provide no parental care, humans as a species generally provide significant parental care for 
many years. Parents, as seen across nations in societal norms and law, are expected to provide for 
their child’s basic needs, including their safety, nutrition, and shelter.  
There are clear biological links involved in the relationship between some parents and 
children—adoptive and stepparents do not have such links. Some might want to argue that this 
biological connection is relevant to the future self as well, but this is unnecessary and potentially 
problematic. First, issues with the biological approach have already been addressed above in 
discussing Parfit. Additionally, adoptive and stepparents are seen as having the same duties as 
biological parents where the biological parents of an adopted child have none. It is the relationship, 
rather than any biology, that seems to ground obligations—assuming the role of parents means 
assuming certain duties.  
Additionally, a parent’s duties to their child exist regardless of their feelings toward them. 
Although I am not a parent myself, it is my understanding that it is common for parents to not 
always like their children. Whether it is because of the newfound, rebellious attitude of a teenager, 
the tantrums of a toddler, or seemingly indefinitely many other circumstances, one may find 
themselves disliking their kid. Regardless, a parent is not justified in failing to fulfill their 
responsibilities to their child anytime they dislike them. While many parents do have subjective 
agent-relative reasons to help their child, I will argue that there are also objective agent-relative 
duties parents have to their children. 
Relatedly, there are other familial relationships as well that, although different from the 
role of a parent, seem to impose duties on those in them. There are quite a few types of familial 




mean those between, say, an aunt and a niece and between siblings, respectively. Examining each 
of these different relationships to evaluate nuances in duties would be interesting but is ultimately 
beyond the scope of my current paper.35 For the sake of brevity, sibling relationships are familial 
ones that do not seem to entail all of the same duties as a parental role, but still seem to ground 
prima facie duties for each sibling. Having grown up with a twin sister, I am familiar with this 
situation. There were countless times growing up where we did things for each other that we would 
not have done for someone who was not our sibling—she sat through way more soccer games and 
I sat through way more dance recitals than either of us would have liked.  
Then there are one’s relationships with friends. The term ‘friend’ is used in many different 
ways—from describing the people who know and care the most about someone, to casual 
acquaintances, and even to those who are nearly strangers. In talking about relationships with 
friends, I am referring to the friends with whom someone has a close personal connection that 
includes shared experiences, interests, and values.36 When a friend asks you for a favor, even when 
it is something you would not regularly agree to do, you feel obliged to help them. There of course 
generally exist subjective agent-relative reasons behind helping a friend with, say, moving out of 
their apartment—you care about them and want them to be helped. However, these positions 
appear to ground duties as well.  
We seem to have duties to our family and friends that generally take precedent over duties 
to others—they provide an additional prima facie duty in weighing one’s all things considered 
duty. Ross gets at this point, as I have mentioned previously, in his critique of utilitarianism. He 
 
35 A number of significant relationships will have to go unexamined in this paper for the sake of time, including 
Ross’s own examples of spouses/partners. 
36 I borrow this description from Jennifer Whiting, “Friends and Future Selves,” The Philosophical Review 95 (1986) 
558 ; Whiting argues that concern for our future selves is a component of psychological continuity, and she argues 
the reverse of what I am arguing, taking our reasons to care about ourselves to show that we have reasons to care 




argues that utilitarianism fails to consider how personal relationships factor into determining right 
action. Positing that personal relationships are the foundation of a prima facie duty, his view is an 
agent-relative one. We do generally care about friends and family members and from this concern 
have reasons to do certain things for them—we have subjective agent-relative reasons to act—but 
I also want to argue that we have objective agent-relative duties to them.  
To a Future Self 
A relationship to a future self is not exactly the same as a parent’s relationship to their 
child. A parent’s prima facie duties to their child are often the most demanding in any relationship, 
and such a dynamic does not seem to hold for the relationship between a present and future self. 
Although there are similarities in that a present self may be required to sacrifice, to a degree, for a 
future self, many people would agree that a parent could morally be required to sacrifice anything 
if their child’s need was great enough, and that is not consistent with the relationship between a 
present and future self.  
Other familial relationships, and those with friends, often create less demanding duties than 
duties grounded in a parental role. Familial relationships are more automatic than those with 
friends, and this is seen in the relationship with the future self as well—a person does not have 
control over standing in a causal relationship with their future selves.37 One has more choice in 
who their friends are, as we are able to choose, to an extent, if we engage with certain people 
enough to form close friendships with them. On the topic of engagement, it looks different in the 
case of a relationship to a future self than it does with the other interpersonal relationship examples. 
 
37 I recognize that individuals may choose how much they engage with their family, but my point here is they 
cannot choose who all stands in familial relations—i.e. father, mother, brother, sister, aunt, uncle, cousin, 





A person cannot have a conversation with their future self because a future self cannot directly 
reply. Instead, the interaction is purely the present self’s causal relation to the future self.38 
We have shared desires, values, and ends from shared experiences and interactions with 
our friends, and with our future selves from a somewhat different causal relationship, as I have 
described above. Relation R—continuity/connectedness—as detailed by Parfit, exists in degrees, 
and, as such, an individual shares more continuity with some people than with others, including 
oneself.  Holding only psychological continuity, as defined by Parfit, to ground obligations could 
significantly limit one’s obligations to a future self because the psychological continuity with a far 
enough removed future self could be so little so as to ground only weak obligations, like those had 
to near strangers. A suggestion here could be that there might be as much range in relationships to 
a future self as there is in one’s relationships with friends and family. Just as you have a closer 
relationship with one friend than with another, or one sibling than with another, so too it seems 
that there would be differing degrees of closeness between temporal parts of oneself. This 
suggestion would seem to entail that my relationship to myself tomorrow grounds stronger prima 
facie duties than my relationship to myself in 10 years. However, I think this idea misrepresents 
the relationship in which we stand to our friends and future selves. The causal relationship in which 
we stand to our future selves grounds objective agent-relative duties, which exist regardless of our 
connection to the ends themselves.39  
I will borrow Kant’s examples to illustrate cases in which one may have such duties to a 
future self. Kant’s first case is of suicide. He argues that suicide is always in violation of the 
 
38 The importance of such causal relations to objective agent-relative duties is discussed in Jeske, 2001. 
39 Jennifer Whiting, “Friends and Future Selves,” (1986) 558 gives this description (common experiences, desires, 
interests, and values and interactions causally affect these desires, interests, and values), based on Parfit’s view ; 
David Brink, “Rational Egoism, Self, and Others,” In O’Flanagan and A Rorty (eds), Identity, Character, and Morality 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990)  argues that our relationships to our future selves and others are grounded in causal 




categorical imperative and as such is always morally wrong. Considering suicide by Ross’s prima 
facie duties, there are conflicts. Take for example someone who is terminally ill with an 
excruciatingly painful disease. That individual’s relation to their future self is the foundation of a 
prima facie duty. There is added weight, then, to any prima facie duties stemming from this 
relation. Considering that all future selves would also suffer from extreme pain, not killing oneself 
would mean a future self suffering. As such, the situation involves the prima facie duty of non-
maleficence, which requires one not to hurt others.40 
However, there are other relationships that are prima facie duties, including relationships 
with friends and family. The duty of non-maleficence applies to them as well because losing their 
friend/relative would hurt them. Killing oneself also eliminates the ability to fulfill any other prima 
facie duties, such as those of fidelity and gratitude. A Rossian approach does not provide an 
ultimate formulation for how to weigh prima facie duties against each other. It relies on the idea 
that one’s all things considered duty in a situation will be knowable by intuition. Still, the prima 
facie duty of non-maleficence to a future self at least factors into the balancing of prima facie 
duties for determining an all things considered duty.  
The case might be made simpler by imagining an individual with such a chronic condition 
who has no family or friends. There is a duty of self-improvement that may still weigh against an 
all things considered duty to suicide—killing themselves would eliminate the possibility of 
subsequent selves and any resulting improvements.41  However, one may respond in this case that 
severe enough chronic pain and a soon approaching death could have eliminated the possibility for 
 
40 I find the duties of non-maleficence and beneficence difficult to differentiate, including in this situation. To avoid 
hurting someone seems to entail an amount of happiness/benefit to them and vice versa. 
41 The phrase ‘to commit suicide’ is sometimes deemed judgmental or normative because ‘commit’ is used in 
connection with crime. While using suicide alone as a verb may read as a mistake at first, it is an intentional writing 




improvement already. While killing themselves would violate a prima facie duty of non-
maleficence to their present self, I believe it is possible in this case to make an argument that the 
all things considered duty is to suicide because of a heavier balance of duties of beneficence/non-
maleficence to the self—both future and present as the pain is ongoing potentially without any 
redeeming quality of life. 
Kant’s second example is of a lying promise. I will focus simply on the idea of making a 
promise to oneself, as the notion of truly lying to oneself seems nonsensical.42 “I promise myself 
______” is a common enough phrase. It is often connected with some sort of idea of self-
improvement, like “I promise myself to eat healthier.” The idea of having a prima facie duty of 
fidelity—to keep promises—to a future self might face some criticism. For example, one may 
question to whom the promise is really being made. Promises are typically made between two or 
more existing individuals, such as someone promising their parents that they will be home for 
dinner. As a future self is, by definition, not present, it may seem like the promise is actually being 
made to the present self. One might additionally argue we do not make promises that bind others—
if I promise my parents that my sister will be home for dinner, a prima facie duty of fidelity is not 
placed on my sister. However, this seems to show a difference between intrapersonal and 
interpersonal cases. When I promise my parents that I will be home for dinner, I am binding a 
future self. We would not find it acceptable if someone stood up in court and argued that a past 
self committed the crime and, because they are a different temporal part than that person, their 
current self should not be the one to be punished. As such, it seems that a past temporal part could 
place prima facie duties of fidelity on subsequent selves to even more removed selves which could 
ground all things considered duties. 
 




Kant’s third example, as previously discussed, is of developing talents. If a person has a 
natural disposition to play the piano well, they have a duty to develop that talent, according to 
Kant. Though not as absolute, this is seen in Ross’s view as well in the prima facie duty of self-
improvement. A duty of self-improvement would be to the benefit of a later person stage, as the 
work the current self puts into practicing the piano will only come to fruition at a later time. A 
person at T1 practices so that their self at T2 has even further developed skills. In terms of a duty 
to a future self, the prima facie duty involved may be that of beneficence, as future selves can 
benefit from the developed skills. 
Another consideration is one’s prima facie duty to their future self’s health. Eating well 
and exercising now is shown to make you healthier later in life, discounting unrelated conditions 
like genetic pre-dispositions to illness. Smoking, on the other hand, is proven to have extremely 
negative effects on one’s health, including causing lung cancer and death. A person’s choices 
regarding health then have the potential to hurt or bring happiness to a future self. If a person 
smokes a pack of cigarettes each day, their future self is likely to suffer as a direct result. Given 
the special relationship with a future self, one has especially weighted prima facie duties to them, 
and an all things considered duty of non-maleficence to a future self could outweigh prima facie 
duties of beneficence to a current self.   
To a Past Self 
In addition to having prima facie duties to future selves, I want to briefly discuss the notion 
of having prima facie duties to a past self— or a future self having prima duties to a present or past 
self. In considering the different prima facie duties, the prima facie duty of gratitude comes to 
mind as one to a past self. This would apply if a former self sacrificed or otherwise did a favor for 




grounds for a later self having a prima facie duty of gratitude, as might a past self’s self-
improvement efforts. The later self would be unable to say thank you to the past self, as might be 
required of a duty of gratitude in another circumstance. However, perhaps this duty could be 




While I have attempted to put together a plausible theory, I realize there could be plenty of 
room for critique. Ross and Parfit’s theories each attract their own objections, and because I have 
endorsed portions of each of their views, my own is not immune to all of those critiques, either. In 
the following section, I will consider a few objections to the theory I have formed regarding duties 
to future selves. 
One objection to consider relates the last section to the first, and that is to argue that 
psychological reductionism actually supports utilitarianism and accepting it while promoting 
agent-relativity is inconsistent. Parfit, for example, takes his own theory to support utilitarianism. 
Person stages are distinct and there can be the same, if not more, psychological continuity between 
persons than between person stages of an individual, according to Parfit. He argues that identity is 
not what matters and that continuity is what is important. Arguing that you can be as connected to 
a different temporal part of yourself as to another person, Parfit claims that the distinction between 
‘you’ and anyone else does not matter and thus arrives at a utilitarian universalizability. I do not 
agree with this jump.43 From my understanding, as I have put it in this paper, Parfit argues that 
 
43 Both Diane Jeske, in “Persons, Compensation, and Utilitarianism,” The Philosophical Review 102 (1993) pp. 541-
575 and Jennifer Whiting, in “Friends and Future Selves,” (1986) pp. 547-580 argue, among others, against 





Relation R comes in degrees. How can such a utilitarian end be required when the relation is 
stronger or weaker based on those involved?44 Instead, it seems that agent-relativity follows from 
psychological reductionism, but that the ‘self’ is less distinguished from other close 
relationships—such as those to family and friends. 
Another objection could be that duties to future selves are really just prudential concerns. 
That is to say that rather than there being prima facie duties to future selves—which is a moral 
notion—a person with this objection would be arguing that people want themselves to do well and 
be happy in the future and act only from this perspective rather than out of any obligation. This 
objection seems to come down to the distinction between objective and subjective agent-relative 
reasons.45 While I agree that there are subjective agent-relative reasons at play because people 
generally care about and want the best for themselves, claiming them as the only factor fails to 
grasp the relationship one has to one’s future self. The relationship one has to one’s future self 
grounds objective agent-relative prima facie duties, similar to how such prima facie duties exist to 
family and friends. 
The final objection I will consider is that any duty to oneself, including to a future self, is 
waivable and so constitutes no significant obligation.46 In order to properly consider this objection, 
it is important to understand what is being said. By suggesting that a duty is waivable, it means 
that the actor who has a duty can be released from it by the object of that duty. For example, if I 
promised an old friend that I would go to dinner with them, I may no longer have a duty to follow 
 
44 This is again based on the notion that utilitarianism can only be agent neutral. 
45 For more discussion of duties to the self and prudence, see Alison Hills, “Duties and Duties to the Self,” American 
Philosophical Quarterly 40 (2003) pp. 131-142. 






through on that promise if they waive it, telling me that it is alright or that they would not be able 
to make it to dinner anyway. This objection brings up a number of interesting things to consider. 
A factor to consider in this objection is how duties can be waived.47 For example, imagine 
a situation in which a person’s friend is dying in a hospital. If the non-hospitalized person hates 
hospitals, can the dying friend waive their duty to visit them? It seems there would be a critical 
difference between the dying person waiving their friend’s obligations out of their own feeling of 
wanting to be alone versus only acting to spare their friend having to do something they disliked, 
despite wanting company. In the former situation, it seems that a prima facie duty of beneficence 
to the dying friend was waived but remained in the latter. Additionally, some duties have been 
argued as un-waivable, such as those involved in the right not to be tortured. 
A case between different temporal parts provides further complexities than an interpersonal 
one. These complexities seem to stem in part from the level of interaction one can have with a 
temporally distinct self. To have a duty to a past self is similar to having a duty to a deceased or 
otherwise inaccessible person—they can no longer directly be affected by the duty being fulfilled. 
However, we still generally seem to hold that we should meet duties to those who are gone. For 
example, if you promised a friend you would take care of their dog after they died, your duty to 
care for the dog remains after the friend has passed away.  Similarly, who would be waiving a duty 
to a future self? A future self does not exist at the same time as a present one, and so it seems they 
would be unable to excuse a present self from an obligation. 
I recognize that this might not be a very satisfying response to this objection. Additionally, 
I recognize that other objections could be raised to my view—I have elected to only address a few 
of them here.  
 
47 Going further into the idea of duties being waived could lead to examining the notion of unwaivable ones. 






 In the previous sections, I hope to have shown that having objective agent-relative duties 
to future selves is plausible. The theory I have detailed is an agent-relative deontological one that 
endorses a Rossian account of duties wherein multiple prima facie duties factor into determining 
one’s all things considered duty. I have also endorsed a psychological reductionist view of personal 
identity. However, having accepted this view, and still believing us to have duties to our future 
selves, I must ground such obligations in more than continuity. I have argued that the special 
relationships a person has to their friends and family are similar to their relationship with their 
future self, and that these relationships ground objective agent-relative duties. There are more 




48 It would not have been possible for me to complete this thesis without many people. I have been lucky to 
receive incredibly informative, supportive, and entertaining mentorship from Professor Diane Jeske and Professor 
Richard Fumerton throughout this project, and I am beyond thankful to them. To my parents, sister, family, and 
friends, thank you for always encouraging and helping me. To Molly, thank you for inspiring me, and for your love, 
support, and humor. To Drake, you have made this world a better place and I can only hope to bring a fraction of 
the kindness, intelligence, and strength to it that you have. I would not have made it through a pandemic-ridden 
senior year without Christine, Sam, Veronica, and Fish. Thank you to my Aunt Laura for preceding me in studying 
philosophy and for no doubt inspiring my interest. In addition to Professor Jeske and Fumerton, I would also like to 
thank Professor Katarina Perovic, Professor Jovana Davidovic, Professor David Cunning, Professor Carrie Swanson, 
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